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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.
vs.

9265

JOSEPH ERSOL BERCHTOLD,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
While appellant's Statement of Facts contains
most of the basic essentials of the case, he has gone far
afield in the recitation of superfluous material and in
arguing the evidence.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH
THE INFORMATION.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS AND IN REFUSING TO
GRANT HIS REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NO. 1 FOR ANY OF THE REASONS SET
FORTH IN HIS POINT II.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 IN ITS ENTIRETY.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO Q U A S H
THE INFORMATION.
Appellant's main argument seems to be that the
acts described in the bill of particulars are not such as
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constitute "reckless disregard of the safety of others"
(41-6-43.10, U. C. A. 1953), and that, therefore,
no cause of action is stated in the information as modified by the bill.
He goes to great effort to show error 1n the
court's denial of his motion to quash, but does so
without the aid of any Utah cases.
He proceeds at the outset to misinterpret the plain
meaning of the phrase in the bill of parctiulars,
u* * * in excess of 70 miles per hour * * *"
failing to realize that "in excess of" might mean any
speed above that figure. It does not mean just 70.
He conveniently avoids a line of Utah law most
helpful to respondent and offers instead citations from
Colorado and California dealing primarily with the
question of speed (ranging from 35 to 73 miles per
hour). His cases are concerned with whether such
speeds constitute "willful misconduct"; and without
citing any authority for his statement, (Appellant's
Brief, pg. 22) he seems to indicate that the term "willful misconduct" is an expression interchangeable with
ureckless disregard for the safety of others.,
It will be noted by this court, of course, that
appellant's cases are worthy of attention only as they
apply to defendant's own version of the facts; that is,
that he was travelling somewhere around 70 miles an
hour. They can provide the court no guidance whatSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ever, though, in light of the testimony of the State's
expert witness, a Ph.D. in physics, that appellant was
travelling at least 110 miles per hour and perhaps
greatly in excess of that figure, and of other evidence
that this occurred on a curved road at night with defendant driving so recklessly as to be wholly unable
to keep the car on the road (T. 16-18, 24-26, 292,
304-305). Apparently, this was the evidence believed
by the jury, and not defendant's own testimony as to
a lesser rate.
Certain! y, a holding by the court of a sister state
to the effect that driving up to 60, 70, or 73 miles per
hour does not constitute "willful misconduct" should
not obligate this court to hold that driving in excess
of 70 miles per hour (actually, as proven, more than
110 miles an hour), along with the other circumstances present, does not constitute "reckless disregard
of the safety of others''.
Fortunately, we are not without local precedent
as to the meaning of "retkless disregard for the safety
of others'', the crucial words in the information and
the statute out of which it arose. In State v. Lingman,
97 Ut. 180, 91 P. 2d 457, an involuntary manslaughter case, defendant was accused of driving approximately 40 miles per hour into an intersection, "which speed
was excessive in view of the width, construction and
obstructions of the said driver's view along the said
highway and the hazard of the intersection * * *",
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the bill of particulars further providing that the defendant was driving and operating the automobile
carelessly and heedlessly, with willful and wanton disregard for the rights and safety of others, and without
due caution and circumspection, and at such a speed
and in such a manner as to endanger life. The court
at page 468 observed that * * * The very act
as charged involves recklessness and a mar ked disregard for the safety of others. * * *''
In State v. Clark, 118 Ut. 517, 223 P. 2d 184,
the court adopted, as a definition of "criminal negligence" sufficient to bring a driver under the involuntary manslaughter statute, a term very much similar
to that used repeatedly in the instant case. There, the
court used the phrase: "recklessness or with a marked
disregard for the safety of others.'' In that case, the
court stated at page 189 that the question was one
for the jury. It said they might well reason that a person driving 30 to 35 miles per hour on an icy road was
''reckless and indifferent of consequences." The court
then stated that there is no hard and fast rule for measuring recklessness. Here, of course, the evidence indicates the probability that Berchtold was driving three
times as fast as the defendant drove in the Clark case,
under somewhat different, but similarly dangerous circumstances.
In State v. Riddle, 112 Ut. 356, 188 P. 2d 449,
the court held that where a driver on a curve in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dark, permitted his automobile to go onto the left side
of the road, reasonable jurymen "not only might
fairly conclude that he was guilty of 'reckless conduct
or conduct evincing a marked disregard for the safety
of others', but could hardly conclude otherwise". Here
defendant completely lost control and allowed his car
to go off the side of the road.
This court held in State v. R·ead, 121 Ut. 453,
243 P. 2d 439, that where defendant's car hit a pedestrian, knocking him 61 feet, on a clear, dry, even,
straight street, not curved, as here, and where skid
marks extended 1410 feet and where defendant had
been doing some drinking, as defendant had here, and
there was alcohol in his car, the jury could reasonably
find that his conduct constituted criminal negligence
of a degree to bring him under the involuntary manslaughter statute, despite his own testimony that he
had drunk only one glass and a portion of a bottle of
beer, and that he was travelling only 25 miles per
hour.
It seems clear then that reasonable minds could
hardly otherwise conclu.de than that driving an auto ..
mobile in the nighttime on a narrow country road
around a curve in excess of 110 miles an hour was an
act in reckless disregard of the safety of others.
To hold to the contrary would tend to nullify
the negligent homicide statute and open the door to
travel at speeds even in excess of those presently conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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templated by the mind of man on any kind of a road
under any circumstance of curvature at any time of day
or night.
Turning from the substantive law involved to
the matter of how far a prosecutor must go in answering a defendant's request, respondent has found that
the Utah court in State v. Lack, 118 Ut. 128, 221 P.
2d 85 5, held that a bill of particulars need not plead
matters of evidence and that the statute providing for
such bill was not intended to compel the prosecution
to give the accused a preview of the evidence upon
which the state was to rely. Nor was defendant in the
instant case handicapped in any way in the preparation
of his defense by what the bill contained. (See State
v.Russell, 106Ut.116, 145P. 2d 1003).
If, indeed, the appellant was unable to make out
in his mind a cause of action from the information in
the first bill of particulars, he was at perfect liberty to
request a supplemental bill, which he failed to do.
(See Section 77-21-3, U. C. A. 1953.)
As a matter of substance, then, the information,
as modified, did constitute a cause of action and as a
matter of procedure, appellant was remiss in failing to
exhaust his ready and simple remedies at the time.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION
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TO DISMISS AND IN REFUSING TO
GRANT HIS REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NO. 1 FOR ANY OF THE REASONS SET
FORTH IN HIS POINT II.
Appellant presents a hodge-podge of assertions
under his Point II, the main burden of which is to indicate error on the part of the court in not granting
defendant's motion to dismiss or his request for a directed verdict.
Speaking generally as to such motions, our courts
have held that it is the sole and exclusive province of
the jury to determine the facts in all criminal cases,
whether the evidence offered by the state be weak or
strong, in conflict or not controverted. Evidence may
be ever so convincing as to the guilt or innocence of a
party charged, yet it is for the jury and not the trial
judge to render the verdict. State v. Green, 78 Ut. 580,
6 P. 2d 177 states:
''Wherever there is adduced in a criminal
prosecution competent evidence from which a
jury can possibly find beyond reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime with
which he is charged, there will no error in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal.''
As to the three questions of motion to dismiss,
motion for directed verdict and motion for a new trial,
the court recently spoke in the case of State v. Penderville, 2 Ut. 2d 281, 272 P. 2d 195, as follows:
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''*

*

*

It has been repeatedly held
by this court that upon a motion to dismiss or
to direct a verdict of not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial court does not consider the
weight of the evidence or credibility of the witnesses, but determines the naked legal proposition of law, whether there is any substantial
evidence of the guilt of the accused, and all reasonable inferences are to be taken in favor of
the state. * * * As is pointed out in one
or more of these cases, the trial court had a discretion in the case of a motion for a new trial
that it does not have in case of a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict of not guilty. Nevertheless, in either case if there is before the court
evidence upon which reasonable men might differ as to whether the defendant is or is not guilty, he may deny the motion."
Again in State v. Erwin, 101 Ut. 365, 120 P. 2d 285
the court said:

"* * * if there is any substantial
evidence * * *, then the weight of the
evidence is for the jury, and the court will not
disturb the verdict."
In State v. Lewellyn, 71 Ut. 331, 266 P. 261, the
court stated:
" ' "It is only in the absence of any evidence tending to establish the guilt of the accused that the trial court will be authorized to
grant a peremptory instruction directing his acquittal.'' ' * * *
'The same principle is decided in State v.
Gross, (Ohio), 110N.E.466.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
'An able discussion and determination of
the bounds of judicial authority in considering
a motion for a directed verdict is contained in
Isbell v. U.S., 142 C. C. A. 312, 227 F. 788,
in which it is made clear that the court in such
case does not consider the weight of evidence or
credibility of witnesses but determines the naked
legal proposition of law whether there is any
substantial evidence of the guilt of the accused.
This is undoubtedly the correct rule. See annotation "Directing Acquittal", 17 A. L. R. 910.
The function of a court in dealing with an application for a directed verdict must not be confused with that in considering a motion for a
new trial upon the grounds of insufficiency of
evidence. The court has a discretion in the latter case which he does not properly have in the
former. The reason for the distinction is that
the order sought in one case acquits the accused
and finally ends the prosecution, while in the
other, the order, if granted, does not discharge
the accused but merely gives him the advantage
and benefit of another trial. The rule is controlled by the same principles in criminal cases
as in civil procedure. And in a civil case, Stam
v. Ogden P. f1 P., 53 Utah 248, 177 P. 218,
this court said:
' ''It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction and perhaps in nearly every other where the
jury system prevails, that, if there is any substantial evidence whatever upon which to base
a verdict, the court will not withdraw the case
from the jury or direct what their verdict
should be.'' ' ''
Appellant urges nine reasons why his Motion to
Dismiss and his requested instruction for a directed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

verdict should have been granted by the court. None
of the reasons has any substantial merit. Appellant
seems merely to be arguing the evidence as he should
have done to the jury. Furthermore, he cites no cases
whatsoever in support of any of the assumptions under his Point II.
Having now laid out general rules, respondent
will address itself to certain specific sub-points raised
under Point II of appellant's brief.
(a) That the testimony of the officers was conflicting.

The full answer to sub-points (a), (b), and
(c) is that the weighing of the evidence is the sole
prerogative of the jury.
We will assume (but not admit) for the purpose
of answering appellant's sub-point (a) that the testi-mony of the officers was conflicting. This constitutes
no legal basis, however, for a motion to dismiss.
The testimony of the two officers could have
been absolutely opposite in every pertinent detail and
still the court would not have been justified in dis ..
missing or directing a verdict. The jury was at absolute liberty to believe all the testimony of one of the
officers, while disbelieving all that of the other and
in relying for its verdict wholly upon the testimony
of the one.
On the other hand, the jury was free to believe
portions of the testimony of both officers, while disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
believing portions of that of both, thus arriving at apparent truth upon the basis of which it could render
its verdict.
If the testimony was in conflict it was up to the
jury to pick out which portions, if any, of that of
either officer it could believe. It was not the prerogative of the court either to accept or reject the testimony
of the officers or to assume to take the determinaion
as to the merit of such testimony from the jury. If
any evidence tending to support the guilt of defendant
came before the jury it was up to the court to allow
the case to go forward.
(b), appellan( s claim that physical evidence
given by the officers, particularly measurements at the
scene, was physically an impossibility. It appears that
appellant is setting himself up as sole arbitrer and that
he is presuming to perform the functions of the jury.
If the allegations could not possibly have been true, the
jury would have so determined. It was up to the appellant to argue such evidence to the jury and is not
his place, now, to urge this court to pass upon the
merits of it.

(c), the alleged false premise used in the calculations of th·e State's expert witness. The truth or
falsity of his premise is neither self-evident nor conclusive regardless how it may appear to appellant.
Again, this is a fact question and the jury evidently
found differently.
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(d), appellant's claim that the testimony of the
State's expert witness was speculative and thus caused
the jury to speculate on its verdict. In so urging, apappellant merely argues portions of the evidence. The
testimony of Dr. Woods was based on certain specific
research, the details of which were brought out by appellant's counsel on cross-examination, that being the
proper way of handling the matter. tJe now attempts
to use the wrong forum for his argument, having
failed in his effort to convince the jury.

As appellant well knows, an expert witness is
not limited in the same way as an ordinary witness.
He may give his opinions as long as they are based on
study, research, or examination, and he may also testify to hypothetical situations. As a consequence, his
testimony may tend to include a rather wide range of
probabilities. To so testify is not to speculate and the
jury was under the same obligation in weighing his
statements as it was in weighing those of other witnesses. Dr. Woods' testimony was weighed and not
found wanting, and it is too late now for appellant to
complain.
(e), appellant's statement that no direct testimony appears in the record that defendant exceeded
the speed of 65 miles an hour. The reason for this, of
course, is that the actual witnesses are dead because of
appellant's recklessness. While there is no direct testimony as to anybody reading on the speedometer a
speed in excess of that figure, it has long been recogSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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nized that an expert, such as Dr. Woods, may testify
as to speed based upon research made after the crash.
See State v. Lingman, 97 Ut. 180, 91 P. 2d 457; State
V. Read, 121 Ut. 453, 243 P. 2d 439. Certainly, the
jury was at liberty to believe Dr. Woods' testimony,
instead of the unsupported self-serving statements of
the appellant.
This court held in State v. Shonka, 3 Ut. 2d 124,
2 79 P. 2d 711 that the jury was not absolutely bound
to believe all the testimony of a defendant and that it
need give it only such weight as the facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence, including the selfinterest of the witness, required. It said that self-interest or improbability can be used to discredit or discount the testimony of a witness and substantive direct
evidence, though uncontradicted, may be disbelieved
by a jury where the witness is a party or otherwise interested.
We have already cited cases under our Point I,
dealing with the matter of speed. While it can be
argued that driving 65 miles an hour is not reckless
disregard for the safety of others under the driving
conditions and other circumstances of this case, still it
would be farcical and the product of a wild imagination to hold that driving 110 miles an hour or more
under the same circumstances does not constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others, a measure of
defendant's recklessness being demonstrated in testimony that his car, after leaving the highway, severed
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a utility pole near the base and continued 69 feet further through a field before coming to rest (T. 18).
The jury, obviously, did not rely on defendant's evidence alone, but took the liberty of believing testimony
as to a much higher rate of speed. Incidentally, while
there might be some question as to the speed achieved
by defendant-that is, over 110 miles per hour-there
can be little question of the car's ability to so perform.
A body mechanic testified (T. 267) that without
having done anything whatsoever to the motor, but
after making repairs on the car's body, he drove the
vehicle in excess of 12 0 miles per hour after the accident.
(f), appellan(s argument that the accident re-

sulted from momentary indecision of the driver after
reaching gravel deposits negligently left by highway
officials at the Hy, of the highway. The jury was

fully apprised of this argument and failed to buy it.
Certainly, appellant's argument cannot be adopted as
a matter of law. The court could not, as it did not,
have invaded the province of the jury to the extent of
directing a verdict on this theory.
Respondent believes sub-point (g) of appellant's
brief is merely a reiteration of his prior arguments and
that it does not need special emphasis; and that (h)
appears to be the same in substance as (d) .
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POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 IN ITS ENTIRETY.
All of appellant's requested instruction No. 10
that conforms to Utah law was covered in substance
by instructions actually given.
A defendant, of course, has no right to have instructions stated in his own words where the applicable law is otherwise given by the court. State v. Cox,
106 Ut. 253, 147 P. 2d 858.
It is enough that an instruction properly states
the law as applied to the facts in issue. State v. Rosenberg, 84 Ut. 402,35 P. 2d 1004.
As to the rna tter of instructions being considered
as a whole, the attention af the cou.rt is referred to
State v. Evans, 74 Ut. 389, 279 P. 950, and State v.
Hendricks, 123 Ut. 267, 258 P. 2d 452. The proper
law, as concerning the facts at hand, is that given by
the court in its instruction No. 3.
The requested instruction is in some measure a
fair statement of the law, but in part goes beyond the
rulings of the Supreme Court, as they are set out in
our Point I. Defendant's rights were fully protected
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by the instructions given in that they encompass all
the law necessary to a proper determination of the
merits of the matter.
We deny that error occurred. But if it did, under
all the circumstances it was not preju.dicial error.

CONCLUSION
Appellant's points are without merit and his appeal should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General,

VERNON B. ROMNEY,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.
Dated August 23, 1960.
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